The final site-work consideration is securing utility-access ports such as manholes. If thereareutility tunnels through which aggressors can enter a building, those accesses should be locked using padlocks or locking bolts. Building elements are the principal construction elements of a system for protecting against a forced entry.
The building elements are used to provide delay. The process for designing to resist forced entry involves laying out concentric "rings" of delay called defensive layers. These defensive layers can include the facility's exterior, interior rooms within that layer, and containers within the interior rooms. The individual building components for each of the layers walls, doors, windows, floors, ceilings, and roofs provide the del ay time see TM For a protective system to be effective against a forced entry, the aggressors must be detected at a point of adequate delay.
Detection at that point can be achieved by using an I DS. Once a sensor detects an aggressor, the alarm annunciator communicates that event to security personnel, who then dispatch a response force. The alarm can be assessed through a guard response or via CCTV. In the covert-entry tactic, an aggressor who is not authorized to be in the facility attempts to enter using false credentials. In the insider- compromise tactic, personnel with legitimate access to a facility try to compromise an asset.
The insider may or may not have legitimate access to the asset itself. The purpose of the entry in either case can be to steal or otherwise compromise the asset or to destroy it. In the latter case, the aggressor may bri ng I E Ds or 1 1 Ds. The general -design strategy for both the insider-compromise and covert- entry tactics is to keep people from entering areas they are not authorized to enter. For covert entry, aggressors are denied access to controlled areas. For insider compromise, aggressors are denied access to assets within controlled areas based on their need to have access to them.
The general-design strategy also includes detecting aggressors removing assets from protected areas and detecting aggressors carrying tools, weapons, and explosives into protected areas. The levels of protection for these tactics address different issues, depending on whether the aggressor's goal is to steal or otherwise compromise an asset or to destroy it.
When the goal is to steal or compromise an asset, the levels of protection vary with the number and sophistication of the access controls required to verify personnel access into a controlled area. When the goal is to destroy the assets, the levels of protection vary with the amount of damage the building and the assets inside are allowed to sustain and the sophistication of detecting weapons or explosives at entry points. Building elements vary with an aggressor's goal.
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To protect against theft or compromise of assets, building elements are used to establish and maintain controlled areas into which only authorized personnel can enter. For insider compromise, there may be an additional requirement that access be further limited among personnel otherwise authorized access to the control led area.
That access is based on the need to have access to a specific asset. The result is that the controlled area may be compartmentalized, and each compartmentalized area may have separate access requirements.
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There are no special construction requirements for these tactics if the goal is theft of compromise. The only requirement is that the building elements of controlled areas should provide enough resistance to require aggressors to force their way through them to gain entry and to provide evidence of the forced entry if it is attempted. Forcing entry would be contrary to the aggressor's assumed goal to be covert.
In addition, a common design goal would be to limit the number of entrances into controlled areas because there will need to be access control at each entry. To protect against the destruction of assets, building elements are used to shield assets from the effects of explosives goi ng off at access-control poi nts. The construction of that area is designed to limit da mage to the rest of the building if an explosive is detonated in that area. Those levels of damage are similar to those discussed in relation to vehicle bombs. The walls and doors between the access point and the protected area will be hardened, and the walls and doors to the outside will be of lightweight construction so that they may fail and vent the blast pressure away from the building.
At the higher level of protection, the access-control area is located in a separate facility and the target building is hardened to resist an explosion in that separate facility. Detection elements for these tactics also vary based on the aggressor's goal.
For theft, the detection elements are mainly related to access control. For destruction, the detection elements are used to detect weapons, explosives, or incendiary devices. The main detection elements for theft or compromise are access-control devices. These can include procedural systems such as guards checking ID , mechanical systems such as keyed or combination locks , or electronic entry- control elements such as electronic card readers, keypads, and biometric devices.
Chapter 6 provides detailed discussion of electronic devices. The sophistication of these elements and the number used varies with the level of protection. For example, achieving the higher levels of protection requires the application of multiple forms of access-control elements such as a card reader and an electronic keypad for electronic-entry control or a badge check and badge exchange for a procedural system. When destruction of the assets is the goal, detection is oriented toward detecting weapons, explosives, or incendiary devices. At the lower levels of protection, it is sufficient for guards to search for carried-in items.
Achieving higher levels of protection requires the application of such equipment as metal detectors. X-ray machines, and explosive detectors. Surveillance and eavesdropping tactics include visual surveillance, acoustic eavesdropping, and electronic-emanations eavesdropping. In these tactics, aggressors remain outside of controlled areas and try to gather information from within those areas. The tools used for these tactics include ocular devices for the visual-surveillance tactic and listening devices and electronic-emanations-eavesdropping equipment for the eavesdropping tactic.
The genera I -design strategy for these tactics is to deny aggressors access to information assets.
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The kind of information objects, operations, or files; secure conversations; or electronically processed data and how it can be compromised differs for each tactic as do the specific protective strategies. Therefore, each tactic is addressed separately. Each of these tactics has only one level of protection.
Either one protects or fails to protect against these tactics. Site-work elements play a minor role in protecting assets from all surveillance or eavesdropping tactics. The main issue is to eliminate or control vantage points from which aggressors can surveil or eavesdrop on assets or operations. In addition, for the visual-surveillance tactic, a design goal can be to block LOSS from vantage points. Items used to block LOSs include trees, bushes, fences, and other buildings see Figure Building elements are the principal components of the protective strategies for surveillance and eavesdropping tactics.
For visual surveillance. Walls and roofs perform this function effectively. Doors are only a problem when they have windows in them or are made of transparent materials. When this is the case, they can be treated like windows or they can be placed in foyers so that there are no direct LOSs through them.
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Windows can be treated with reflective film and drapes or blinds as described in the ballistics tactics. When there are LOSs through skylights, they should be treated like windows. Building elements for acoustic eavesdropping relate to the construction of areas preferably separated from the building exterior that minimize the sound that can be transmitted through them.
This requires specialized construction that has a sound-transmission-coefficient STC rating. Walls, floors, and ceilings can be constructed to achieve specific STC ratings using conventional construction materials as described in TM Doors and windows that are STC rated are commonly manufactured and tested as assemblies. This type of design and construction can be expensive.
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This is specialized, metal- shielded construction that is very expensive. In mail- and supply-bomb tactics, aggressors place bombs in materials delivered toa facility. Explosives used in supply bombs aresignificantly larger briefcase size than those in mail bombs pipe bombs or smaller. Mail bombs are usually directed at individuals, while supply bombs may be used to target larger numbersof people. These tactics assumethatthefacility containing the asset has a mail-handling area or a supplies-handling and -receiving area. These tactics do not apply if mail or supplies are handled and screened in a different facility.
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A bomb exploding within a building has more severe effects than the same size bomb exploding outside of the facility because the blast pressures cannot dissipate inside. Also, there is no standoff distance between the explosive and thefacility to mitigate blast effects. The general-design strategy Design Approach FM This minimizes the damage to the remainder of the facility.
Occupants and contents within the mail room or supplies-handling area are likely to be killed or destroyed if an undetected bomb explodes. The levels of protection for mail and supply bombs are based on the amount of damage allowed to the building and, therefore, the occupants of the building. They also vary based on the sophistication of the detection measures used.
The purpose of building elements in relation to these bomb tactics is to shield assets from the effects of explosives going off at supply areas, receiving points, or mail rooms. The basic approach is to lay out either a mail room or a supplies-receiving area in which people can search suspicious packages for explosives or incendiary devices. Constructing this type of area will limit the damage to the rest of the building if an explosive is detonated there.
Mail rooms should be located on the facility's exterior, away from any critical assets. The walls and ceiling between the mail room and the remainder of the building are hardened to keep the blast effects out of the facility. The exterior walls and doors should be of lightweight construction so that they may fail and vent the blast pressure away from the building.
There may be an explosives container in the mail room where suspicious packages can be placed. If the package explodes, the container will keep its effects from causing damage or injury. The hardened construction will protect assets outside of the mail room if the explosion occurs outside of the container. Check with EOD personnel to determine the local policy for using explosive containers.
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